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INTRODUCTION
While biology, birth, and the marital presumption are still the traditional
bases on which legal parentage is established, intent is playing an everincreasing role in parentage determinations. Most significantly, intent has
been used as a proxy for biology to establish legal parentage.1 Conversely,
intent has also been critical in recognizing the right of a party not to
procreate or have the responsibilities that flow therefrom. The increased
recognition of intent within the parentage law puzzle creates a greater
contrast with the use of biology alone to establish paternity, especially
*
Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to Nancy Polikoff for
inviting me to participate in a fabulous and timely conference, “The New
‘Illegitimacy’: Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on Marriage,” to my
friends and colleagues at the conference who shared their thoughtful feedback, and to
the staff of the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law for
their assistance finalizing this Essay. And love and thanks to Shane and Jacob Broyles,
for supporting me every step of the way.
1. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 280, 293 (Ct. App.
1998) (holding that a husband and wife, neither of whom were genetically related to
their daughter, were her legal parents because of their intent to conceive and raise her).
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those cases initiated by a state’s IV-D agency (the agency charged with
establishing paternity judgments and child support orders).2
The relationship between intent, conception, and procreation has created
a gulf of inconsistency between how legal parentage is determined in the
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) context compared with the
traditional paternity establishment context. In the paternity establishment
context, if an unmarried man and woman have sex and the woman becomes
pregnant, the man will likely be adjudicated the child’s legal father
regardless if he had any intent to conceive or procreate a child.3 By
contrast, a man who has actively participated in the process of conception
via in vitro fertilization has routinely been permitted to change his mind
regarding subsequent use of the embryos in an attempt to protect his
procreative liberty.4
In this Essay, I challenge why a man who has no intent or desire to be a
father should be adjudicated a legal father—with subsequent legal
responsibilities—and whether courts and legislatures are applying
procreative autonomy equally to all constituents. Arguably, moral disdain
for poor adults who conceive out of wedlock has resulted in forced
fatherhood for primarily low-income individuals, whereas wealthier men
who use assisted reproductive technologies have greater protection of their
procreative freedom. Men who engage in non-marital sex that results in a
child will likely be required to pay a “tax”—child support—while a man
who engages in non-coital procreative activities is often alleviated of such a
burden.
Although procreation through intercourse is necessarily different than
procreation achieved using ART, I question the difference in legal
treatment of the persons involved. Furthermore, this Essay illustrates that
as the laws of parentage broaden, we call into question traditional
parentage doctrines. Notably, family law permits deviation from the twoparent model for wealthier individuals who choose parenthood by choice
through ART but imposes unwanted parenthood on many men in the
interest of the public fisc. Applying the principles of procreative autonomy
equally, it is hard to reconcile parentage by intention and parenthood by
2. See 45 C.F.R. § 309.05 (2010) (“IV-D services are the services that are
authorized or required for the establishment of paternity, establishment, modification,
and enforcement of support orders, and location of noncustodial parents under title IVD of the Act.”).
3. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the Michigan Paternity Act did not violate a putative father’s equal protection or due
process rights, even though he had expressed to the child’s mother that he had no desire
to be a father, and she assured him of her infertility and use of contraception).
4. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (holding that a
former husband’s procreative liberty interest prevented his former wife from
implanting embryos against his will).
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imposition.
As Professor John Robertson wrote in Children of Choice, “At the most
general level, procreative liberty is the freedom either to have children or to
Procreative liberty is often discussed as
avoid having them.”5
encompassing two parts: the freedom to reproduce and the freedom to
avoid reproduction.6 Most of the Supreme Court’s procreative liberty
jurisprudence has focused on the right to avoid procreation, but in Skinner
v. Oklahoma,7 the Court explicitly affirmed the fundamental right to
procreate. Specifically, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute that
proscribed compulsory sterilization for a habitual criminal.8 The Court
reasoned, “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race . . . . Any experiment which the
State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty.”9
The Court has focused greater attention on the right to avoid procreation.
Traditionally, avoiding procreation either meant abstaining from sex, using
contraception to prevent conception, or abortion. The Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the right to avoid procreation numerous times in the past few
decades. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that
married couples have the right to avoid reproduction through use of
contraception.10 Several years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court
clarified that the right to avoid reproduction extended to individuals, not
just to married couples.11 One year later, in Roe v. Wade, the Court said
that a woman’s right to an abortion—the right to avoid reproduction after
conception—is a constitutionally protected right.12 While the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence has evolved in the past thirty plus years, the
essential holding in Roe—a woman’s right to an abortion—remains
5. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994).
6. Id. at 25 (analyzing two types of procreative liberty).
7. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that mandatory sterilization of one convicted
of stealing chickens and armed robbery was unconstitutional because it violated equal
protection).
8. Id. at 541.
9. Id.
10. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut
law that forbids the use of contraceptives violates the marital right of privacy).
11. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that an outright ban on
abortion unconstitutionally infringed on a woman’s privacy right, but concluding that
certain limitations on abortion are constitutional).
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intact.13 Professor Robertson explains, “[D]eprivation of the ability to
avoid reproduction determines one’s self-definition in the most basic
sense . . . . It . . . centrally affects one’s psychological and social identity
and one’s social and moral responsibilities. The resulting burdens are
especially onerous for women, but they affect men in significant ways as
well.”14
Inherent within the definition of procreative liberty that embraces the
freedom to have children or not is the concept of intent: does a person
intend to have a child or intend not to have a child? A woman has the legal
right to choose whether to carry a child to term upon learning that she is
pregnant; a man has no such corresponding right. Allow me to clarify at
the outset that I am not arguing for men to have the right to interfere with a
woman’s abortion right: either to force a woman to have one or preclude
her from obtaining one. Rather, I am challenging why a man who has no
intent or desire to be a father should be adjudicated a legal father against
his will. This Essay is part of a larger inquiry in which I challenge why
biology and the marital presumption, rather than intent, create greater rights
to legal parentage.
The increased use of ART to conceive children has resulted in an
increased reliance on intention to establish parenthood. Through ART, we
can fully appreciate the distinction between conception and procreation: as
I will discuss shortly, a couple may use in vitro fertilization to conceive and
create embryos and yet they may decide not to procreate or one member of
the couple may decide that procreation should not occur. In fact, abortion
works similarly to protect a woman’s right to avoid procreation once
conception has already occurred. This is an important right that I fully
support, but it illustrates the separation between conception and
procreation. A woman who chooses to continue a pregnancy has made a
conscious choice to procreate. She may ultimately decide not to parent, but
she has exercised her right to procreate.
A father has no corresponding right. He has neither the ability to force a
woman to abort nor to prevent her from aborting. In essence, once
conception has occurred, he no longer has a negative procreative right, only
the woman does. Fathers have challenged paternity laws as violations of
their due process and equal protection rights, including their right to
procreational autonomy.15 The equal protection challenges are generally
13. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 124-25 (2007) (upholding Congress’s
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a legitimate exercise of the State’s power to
restrict abortion after viability in accordance with the central holding of Roe).
14. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 24.
15. E.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing N.E. v. Hedges,
391 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2004), for the proposition that, “the right to privacy . . .
does not encompass a right to decide not to become a parent after conception and
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framed as trying to have the same right as a woman to choose to be, or not
to be, a parent; those claims have been uniformly unsuccessful.16 Given
recent developments in ART and various situations in which men have
been able to assert a negative procreative right or right not to parent,17 men
facing a paternity suit may have new claims and could argue that the
differential treatment of fathers in the traditional paternity context
contrasted with the ART context has no rational basis. Due to the
deference and protection given to known sperm donors or male in vitro
fertilization (IVF) donors who withdraw their consent, men who had no
intent to procreate through intercourse may be able to argue that they are
not being treated equally under the law and that paternity statutes do, in
fact, violate their equal protection. As intentional parenthood’s influence
grows, we should rethink the constitutionality and legitimacy of the current
system.
For purposes of this Essay, I broadly interpret procreative liberty as the
intent to choose to legally parent children or choose not to legally parent
children. In the context of ART, distinctions can be made between genetic,
gestational, and legal parents. For instance, the 2000 Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA) recognizes a distinction between genetic and legal parenthood.18
With the growing use of sperm and egg donors, more parents are legal
parents because of their actions in intending to bring about the birth of a
child, rather than their genetic makeup.19 Arguably, then, procreative
autonomy applies not merely to genetic parenthood but to legal parenthood.
A further assumption in this Essay is that the act of fertilization or
conception is distinct from the act of procreation. Throughout history, the
act of conception (a sperm that fertilizes an egg to form an embryo) could
not reliably be separated from the act of procreation (the freedom to have
children). If a man and woman had sex and an egg was fertilized,
conception automatically led to procreation (assuming a pregnancy to
term). Now, ART allows us to separate voluntary acts that result in
birth”).
16. See, e.g., id. at 430-31 (holding that the Michigan Paternity Act is rationally
related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring support for minor children born out of
wedlock).
17. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that one
has the right to avoid procreation after a human embryo is intentionally created outside
of the womb).
18. The UPA provides that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means
of assisted reproduction.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
355 (2001).
19. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (invalidating an
agreement between an IVF clinic and a formerly married couple concerning the
disposition of the couple’s frozen embryos because the agreement no longer
represented the intent of the couple and would compel one donor to become a parent
against his will).
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conception and voluntary acts for the purposes of reproducing. While the
acts may be related, they are not the same.
For example, consider In re Marriage of Buzzanca: a husband and wife
who both suffered from infertility utilized a sperm donor and an egg donor
to create embryos, and had them transferred to a gestational surrogate.20
Conception occurred upon successful creation of the embryos.21 Arguably,
however, the couple chose to procreate when they proceeded to have the
embryos transferred to the gestational surrogate.22 While the surrogate was
pregnant, the couple filed for divorce.23 After the child’s birth, the husband
tried to claim he was not the legal parent of the child because he was not
genetically related to the child.24 The Buzzanca court held that the husband
and wife were the child’s legal parents regardless of genetics because the
parties consented to medical procedures with the intent to procreate a
child.25 Thus, the court relied on the intent of the parties to determine
parentage.26
The relationship between intent, conception, and procreation has created
a dramatic inconsistency between how legal parentage is determined in the
ART context compared with the traditional paternity establishment context.
In the paternity establishment context, if an unmarried man and woman
have sex and the woman becomes pregnant, the man will likely be
adjudicated the child’s legal father regardless if he had any intent to
conceive or procreate a child.27 Even if he believed the woman was using
contraception or was infertile, he will have no defense against an action for
paternity.28 His intent is irrelevant. I have highlighted in a previous work
20. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the persons who intended to parent the child—John and Luanne—were
the child’s parents because of their intent and, further, that no other legal procedures,
such as adoption, were necessary to establish their legal parentage).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 282-83.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 292 (analogizing to the statute governing artificial insemination,
which makes a husband the lawful father of a child if he consents, and concluding that
both intended parents are Jaycee’s legal parents because of their consent to the medical
procedures used to cause Jaycee’s conception and birth).
26. See id. at 293 (referring to Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), where
the California Supreme Court focused on intent as the deciding factor in a child custody
case).
27. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that Dubay
owed child support to a woman when she became pregnant with his child after
informing him that she was infertile and using contraception); see also Adrienne D.
Gross, A Man’s Right to Choose: Searching for Remedies in the Place of Unplanned
Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1015-25 (2007) (describing numerous legal
theories that men have unsuccessfully pled to attempt to disclaim parentage).
28. In a most unusual case, a man alleged he did not even have sex with a woman
but that she performed fellatio, saved the sperm and later self-inseminated with it, thus
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that sometimes a biological father will be precluded from establishing his
paternity because of application of the marital presumption or the Supreme
Court’s line of cases that require more than a biological connection to
preserve paternal rights.29 So, intent generally plays no role in paternity
establishment, regardless of whether a man has intent to parent or not.
Federal paternity establishment law and policy overrides a man’s right
not to reproduce and his right not to parent.30 In two other significant
contexts, however, a man’s right not to parent is given tremendous respect:
(1) known sperm donors; and (2) ex-husbands who do not want ex-wives to
use frozen embryos.31 A man who unintentionally impregnates a single
woman is given no such deference.
Using these three scenarios, I explore the interplay between intent and
procreative liberty. In the two scenarios in which ART is used, a man’s
lack of procreative intent trumps legal parenthood; in other words, a man
will not be a legal parent against his will. In the scenario in which
conception occurs through intercourse, a man’s intention not to conceive or
procreate is given no deference.
Why are these cases treated so differently? Many argue that the best
interests of the child dictate that a child have two parents; more
specifically, the State has an interest in having two parents who can
potentially support a child. Increasingly, though, in ART cases, courts and
legislatures are moving from the two-parent paradigm often to preserve
procreative autonomy. Whether those values should apply to traditional
paternity establishment is the subject of the remainder of this Essay.
Federal paternity establishment policy is a reflection of the strict
adherence to a two-parent paradigm.32 It is predicated on wanting to
eliminate the negative implications of “illegitimacy” and ensure that
children have both a mother and father.33 For many years, a child born out
becoming pregnant. He was adjudicated the child’s father and ordered to pay child
support. See Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1 (App. Ct. Ill.
Feb. 22, 2005).
29. See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads] (discussing
the comparative importance of marriage and biology in determining legal paternity).
30. Federal Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (2006).
31. See Katharine Baker, Bargaining or Biology: The History and Future of
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2004)
(discussing sperm donors’ lack of parental rights).
32. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 29, at 823-24; Melanie B. Jacobs, Why
Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to
Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 318 (2007) (discussing family
law doctrine’s emphasis on two parents).
33. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 29 at 823-24 (concluding that the
Uniform Parentage Act was promulgated in response to Supreme Court rulings
emphasizing the importance of two legal parents).
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of wedlock only had one legal parent, the mother.34 In fact, unwed fathers
often had no rights or responsibilities to their biological children.35 In the
1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court rendered a number of opinions in
which it determined that non-marital children were entitled to many of the
benefits of marital children.36 The Court made several rulings to protect
the rights of children born out of wedlock, such as the right to receive child
support,37 sustain an action for wrongful death,38 and recover under a
state’s worker’s compensation law.39
In response to these Supreme Court decisions, and in an effort to
equalize the rights of non-marital and marital children, the UPA was
promulgated in 1973.40 The Act’s purpose was to establish a civil scheme
whereby legal parentage would be established for non-marital children,
allowing for corresponding child support obligations and custody benefits,
and to ensure that a child has two legal parents to provide financial and
emotional support.41 Soon thereafter, Congress entered the paternity arena.
As Professor Laura Oren has observed, “[e]ver since 1975, with increasing
vehemence, federal policy has encouraged and, indeed, coerced the
identification of the biological fathers of non-marital children.”42
Paternity establishment and a child’s corresponding entitlement to
support and benefits are often based purely on biological connection.43
Regardless of the father’s intent or desire to parent, he will be adjudicated
the child’s legal father and will have all the responsibilities of fatherhood.

34. Id. at 816.
35. See Baker, supra note 31, at 6 (discussing the refusal of several states to impose

any duties of support on biological fathers, and noting that a court even refused to
permit a child to have his paternity investigated).
36. Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 29, at 823.
37. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that children born out
of wedlock are constitutionally entitled to the same right of support as are children of
married parents).
38. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that it violated equal
protection not to permit five children born out of wedlock to seek damages as a result
of the wrongful death of their mother).
39. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (holding that
it violated equal protection not to permit two children born out of wedlock to sue under
a worker’s compensation law because the children, living in a house with their unwed
mother and father and their father’s four legitimate children from his marriage,
comprised an intact family and were as dependent on their father’s income as the
legitimate children).
40. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory n. (1973), 9B U.L.A. 378-80 (2001).
41. See id. (discussing the goals of the Uniform Parentage Act).
42. Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology
‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 94 (2004).
43. See Baker, supra note 31, at 8-9 (analyzing the role of biology in determining a
child’s entitlement to child support).
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Professor Katharine Baker has written, “much paternity law seems to be
based on a strict liability theory for genetic contribution.”44
Federal paternity establishment policies are not predicated on a two
professionals scenario, but rather on a low-income mother who will require
state assistance if the father does not pay child support.45 Ironically, many
of those mothers still require assistance, regardless of a support order,
given that most men to whom the system is directed cannot afford enough
child support to remove the mother and child from assistance.46 Professor
Leslie Harris has argued, “This evidence strongly suggests that the problem
of childhood poverty cannot be solved simply by pursuing absent
biological parents, mostly fathers, for child support. Yet the rhetorical and
policy emphasis on this strategy effectively diverts discussion and attention
from the question of our collective responsibility to provide for children
economically, thus serving political ends.”47
Despite protestations that federal paternity and child support policy
unduly impinges on a man’s procreative rights, courts and commentators
rely on the argument that it is necessary for a child to receive child support
from her or his father.48 Unfortunately, though, the reality of child support
collection and enforcement does not accord with our current system.
Professor Daniel Hatcher has studied the federal policy of paternity
establishment and child support collection and has concluded that the
current model is largely a failure.49 Like Professor Oren, Hatcher points
out that poor mothers are forced to name absent fathers and sue them again
and again to try to collect child support but the fathers are also poor and
generally cannot afford to pay.50 Moreover, the relationships between the
mothers and fathers “can be obliterated through the process [and] [t]he
hopes of children to have fathers who are supportive and involved in their
lives are often dissolved.”51 Worse, Hatcher’s analysis reveals that, “the
net financial benefit to the government resulting from welfare cost recovery
44. Id.
45. See Federal Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (2006) (requiring that

mothers who receive welfare assistance cooperate with the state agency to establish
paternity and support obligations or face the risk of losing a portion of the welfare grant
unless good cause is established).
46. Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 461, 476-77 (1996).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 477.
49. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the
Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1029, 1030-31 (2007) (discussing the expense of welfare and the failure of the current
welfare program in assisting needy families).
50. See id. at 1031.
51. Id.
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is minimal and may actually be negative.”52 So it is often inaccurate that
paternity establishment with a corresponding child support order serves the
best interests of children.
Below, I discuss the basic paternity establishment scenario and the
current jurisprudence that rejects a man’s claims that forced fatherhood
violates his procreative liberties. Then, I contrast those claims with claims
in the ART context and conclude that going forward, men may have a
compelling argument against the current legal regime.
Scenario One: A Guy Walks Into a Bar . . . and Walks Out a Father Who
Owes Child Support
A man meets a woman at a bar. Assume they are two professionals,
meeting at the hotel bar in a city to which they have both traveled for a
conference. They drink, they bond over their miles perks programs, and,
ultimately, head upstairs and have sex. They are responsible professionals;
the man uses a condom, which unfortunately breaks. A few weeks later,
the woman learns she is pregnant. On the night of conception, over drinks
at the bar, the man had confided that he never wants to have children (nor a
relationship). The woman has had an interest in motherhood and, despite
her reservations about her career and the emotional toll of going through
this pregnancy without a partner, decides that this might be her best chance
to have a child; thus, she chooses to proceed with the pregnancy. She has
the business card of the man, and when she calls to share the news, he is
completely taken aback and says, “You know I don’t want anything to do
with the baby, right?”
Regardless of the fact that the woman was aware of the man’s desire not
to procreate and his intent not to reproduce, her desire to have a baby is all
that is legally relevant and if she does pursue child support, she will be able
to obtain it. In fact, even if the parties sign a contract in which they agree
that the man is not responsible for child support, that contract will be
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.53 He will be adjudicated the
legal father and ordered to pay support, regardless of whether he has any

52. See id. at 1032 (“And there is little gain to counter the loss because welfare cost
recovery is largely a fiscal failure. The goal is simple: reduce government spending by
recouping the costs from the person who should have been providing such financial
support in the first place, the absent parent . . . . Further, the small percentage of
assigned support that is successfully collected is diverted from the children and their
families when they most need it, decreasing their economic stability and increasing
their likelihood of needing welfare again in the future.”).
53. See Kristine M. v. David P., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 749 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding
that if the father voluntarily terminates his parental rights with the mother’s approval as
a matter of convenience to guarantee no contact between the father and child and to
obviate the father’s support obligation, public policy will intervene to “protect the
child’s continued right to support”).
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contact with the child.54
Paternity laws certainly have not gone unchallenged. A 2004 Sixth
Circuit case provides one example of the types of challenges some men
have brought in their efforts not to have their paternity established (and
corresponding support order entered). In N.E. v. Hedges, the biological
father alleged that his substantive due process rights, specifically,
procreative privacy rights, were violated by Kentucky’s paternity
establishment and child support order statute.55 The court rejected his
claim and held that the statute establishing paternity and enforcing a child
support obligation does not violate his substantive due process rights.56
The court stated:
Plaintiff has identified no action taken by a state actor that impacted in
any way his choice to father a child. As he complains of actions taken
under the Commonwealth’s statutes that permit the establishment of
paternity and the imposition and enforcement of child support
obligations, the Court sees no evidence that the state required him to
engage in the sexual activity that resulted in the conception of his son.
Further he has identified no action taken by a state actor that interfered in
any way with his choice to use or not to use contraceptive methods—or
additional contraceptive methods, as the case may be—during sexual
activity to avoid his sexual partner’s resulting pregnancy.57

The court’s language is fascinating: although it opined that no state actor
impacted the plaintiff’s choice to father a child, the paternity statute does
just that.58 The state-enacted paternity statute imposed fatherhood and a
financial obligation because of his biological relationship to the child.59
The man made a choice to have sex; he did not have the intent to conceive
a child and certainly not the intent to procreate or rear a child. The court
truly got to the heart of the matter, “Child support has long been a tax
fathers had to pay in Western civilization.60 For reasons of child welfare
and social utility, if not for moral reasons, the biological relationship
between a father and his offspring—even if unwanted and
54. Id. at 752-53.
55. 391 F.3d 832, 834 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574,

580 (1987) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies substantive
due process in paternity proceedings and that a . . . “putative father has no legitimate
right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial obligations to his natural
child that are validly imposed by state law”).
56. Hedges, 391 F.3d at 843.
57. Id.
58. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.021 (West 2011) (providing that a county
attorney or the Cabinet for Health and Family Services may bring about an action to
determine paternity “upon complaint of the mother, putative father, child, person, or
agency substantially contributing to the support of the child”).
59. Id.
60. Hedges, 391 F.3d at 836.
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unacknowledged—remains constitutionally sufficient to support paternity
tests and child support requirements.”61 Finally, the court concluded,
“Reproduction and child support requirements occur without regard to the
male’s wishes or his emotional attachment to his offspring.”62
The court’s opinion highlights the gross inconsistency between paternity
establishment and cases in which intent is used to establish legal parentage
or preserve the right not to procreate. The court seemingly embraces the
“assumption of the risk” approach to parenthood that is generally used in
tort; essentially, if a man has sex with a woman, regardless of his intent not
to conceive, he will be liable for child support if a child is born. As the
Hedges court wrote, child support is a tax fathers have to pay. But not all
fathers have to pay this tax; if N.E. had given his sperm to the child’s
mother so that she could conceive, he would be relieved of parental
responsibility.
It is hard to believe that our legal system of paternity should be
predicated on punishing people for having sex. That reasoning was
explicitly refuted by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the
Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that prohibited single individuals
from accessing contraception.63
In refuting the rationale that the
Commonwealth was, in part, attempting to deter premarital sex by enacting
the law, the Court wrote, “[I]t would be plainly unreasonable to assume
that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted
child as punishment for fornication.”64 Ironically, that is exactly the way in
which federal paternity establishment works.
Hedges illustrates the legal discrepancy of determining parentage after
intercourse versus after the use of ART procedures: courts can presume a
level of intent in traditional parentage cases that is not apparent in ART
cases. The Hedges court conflates sexual conduct, conception, and child
rearing, but they are three distinct activities.65 Moreover, it is highly
problematic to infer the intent to conceive and procreate a child from the
intent to have sex.
Scenario Two: A Woman Walks into a Bar . . . and Walks Out a Single
Mother
Let us vary the facts: the same woman is anxious to have a baby. She is
single and successful and while the right partner may not have appeared in
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 448.
See Hedges, 391 F.3d at 834-36 (maintaining the importance of the biological
father’s child support duties regardless of lack of intent to father a child).
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her life, she very much would like to be a mother. If our single woman
used sperm from an anonymous donor, there would be no question about
her single parent status and the donor’s lack of legal parentage. A donor
donates sperm with the express intent that his sperm will be used for
conception even though he has the intent not to assume parental status. His
actions are likely more voluntary than the man who has sex: the man who
has sex has the intent to have sex and nothing more. The donor voluntarily
intends to conceive but no intent to procreate and parent a child. The UPA
supports that a sperm donor has no legal status as a parent.66
But let us vary the facts again so that the scenario is more similar to the
first: a woman meets a handsome professional at a bar and asks him to be a
sperm donor. He makes it clear he has no desire to be a parent and they
agree that he will not assert parental rights and she will not pursue any
parental obligation against him, specifically child support. She changes her
mind a few years later, when she realizes daycare is nearly as expensive as
private high school, but the court agrees that the man’s lack of intent to
parent means that he cannot now be adjudicated the father. She can be a
single mother.
The only difference between these scenarios is the act of intercourse. As
I have argued, intercourse, itself, does not represent the intent to conceive
and procreate. In two recent state court opinions, even known sperm
donors were held not to be legal parents regardless of their status as genetic
parents.67 In one case, the donor had no intent to be a parent (more akin to
the traditional paternity cases).68 In the other, the man appeared to have no
intent to parent at the time of conception or gestation but changed his mind
after the birth of the child.69 I think both cases were correctly decided, and
illustrate the widening gulf between basing parentage on the intent to
procreate compared with the more traditional biological basis.
In Ferguson v. McKiernan, former romantic partners agreed that donor
would provide sperm for the woman/mother to use for assisted
insemination in a clinic.70 The court recounted that the donation would
feature all of the hallmarks of an anonymous donation, but for the
important fact that the donor was known.71 The parties agreed that the
donor’s role in the conception would remain confidential, that he would
66. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001)
(stating that a donor is not the parent of a child conceived as a result of assisted
reproduction).
67. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940
A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
68. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1238.
69. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1029.
70. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1238.
71. Id.
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have no custodial or visitation rights, and that the mother would not seek
support.72 For five years following the twin’s births, neither party
challenged the agreement; then, the mother sought child support.73 The
trial court, despite its dismay at the mother’s dishonest behavior, entered a
support order, consistent with what was in the best interest of the child and
public policy.74
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed.75 The court observed the
vast continuum between a “mere sexual encounter” that produces a child
via intercourse obligating the man to pay child support and anonymous
sperm donation that creates no parental responsibilities.76 The court found
that the Ferguson facts most closely resembled the anonymous donation
cases and ruled that the parties’ original agreement was enforceable and
that the trial court erred in imposing the child support order.77 Even though
anonymity was not preserved, the court did not wish to hinge its result on
that distinction.78 The court wrote that if such a distinction were tenable:
It would mean that a woman who wishes to have a baby but is unable to
conceive through intercourse could not seek sperm from a man she
knows and admires, while assuring him that he will never be subject to a
support order and being herself assured that he will never be able to seek
custody of the child. Accordingly, to protect herself and the sperm
donor, that would-be mother would have no choice but to resort to
anonymous donation or abandon her desire to be a biological mother,
notwithstanding her considered personal preference to conceive using the
sperm of someone familiar, whose background, traits, and medical
history are not shrouded in mystery. To much the same end, where a
would be donor cannot trust that he is safe from a future support action,
he will be considerably less likely to provide his sperm to a friend or
acquaintance who asks, significantly limiting a would-be mother’s
reproductive prerogatives.79

Arguably, this approach places tremendous emphasis on a woman’s
procreative right—she can parent solo. But this approach also recognizes
the importance of intent within procreative liberty, regarding both the right
to choose to parent and the right to choose not to parent. By refusing to
impose parental responsibilities on the donor, the Ferguson court validated
the parties’ original intent concerning the sperm donation and promoted the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
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procreative liberty of both parties.80
The Kansas Supreme Court has similarly recognized the procreative
liberty rights of a single woman and a known sperm donor.81 In In re
K.M.H., an unmarried woman wanted to become a parent using the sperm
of a male friend.82 There was no written agreement between the parties,
but the woman contended that the “mutual pre-insemination intent of the
parties” clearly demonstrated that the donor would not have any parental
rights or responsibilities and that she would be the only legal parent.83
After she gave birth to twins, the mother filed a petition to confirm the
donor’s lack of parental status; the donor filed an answer alleging that he
was, indeed, the father of the twins and further acknowledged his financial
responsibility.84
Relying on a Kansas statute that bars a donor from any parental status in
the absence of a written agreement, the mother argued that the donor
should not be able to establish his paternity.85 The Kansas Supreme Court
agreed and found that the particular provision of the statute was enacted “to
prevent the creation of parental status where it is not desired or expected.”86
The Court noted a potential equal protection concern in that a woman will
always be a parent under the statute but that a man will never be a parent
unless there is a written agreement with the woman, but upheld the statute’s
constitutionality because of the statute’s legitimate purposes.87 Like the
Ferguson court, the K.M.H. court concluded that the statutory bar against
donor paternity “encourages men who are able and willing to donate sperm
to such women by protecting the men from later unwanted claims for
support from the mothers or the children.88 It protects women recipients as
well, preventing potential claims of donors to parental rights and
responsibilities, in the absence of an agreement. Its requirement that any
such agreement be in writing enhances predictability, clarity, and
enforceability.”89
These cases highlight that separating intercourse from conception may
enable a man to avoid legal fatherhood (or that the woman can prevent the
man from asserting paternity) and further highlights that the intent not to
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1248.
In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1030.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id.
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parent will be judicially validated in certain circumstances. In both
Ferguson and K.M.H. the parties intended that the known donor would not
assume parental rights.90 The court deemed the original intent not to parent
as judicially sufficient to bar subsequent paternity adjudications of the
sperm donors, despite both courts’ reluctance to deviate from the twoparent paradigm.91
A perhaps tangential, but important, point to make is that women who
have the means to conceive using anonymous sperm donation or who
choose to ask a friend to donate sperm are given the legal protection to be
single mothers, free from interference of a sperm donor who might change
his mind and seek parental rights. Women from lower socio-economic
backgrounds are not given the choice to be single mothers. A woman who
receives public assistance is required to comply with the state IV-D agency
and name the person (or persons) she believes might be the father of her
child, and the state then pursues a paternity order for the purpose of
obtaining a support order.92 As discussed above, the process often harms
the potential father-child relationship. More significantly, though, is that
the rational basis asserted for imposed fatherhood is the importance of two
parents, especially for financial support. Yet, if a woman uses the sperm of
a known or anonymous sperm donor, she will be the only legal parent and
only parent responsible for supporting the resulting child(ren). Thus, it
seems the full breadth of procreative liberty applies to persons of financial
means whereas lower income persons are unable to fully avail themselves
of procreative liberty.
Scenario Three: A Husband Walks Out on His Wife and Their Embryos . . .
and Will Not be a Father by Force
Here is the third scenario in which courts distinguish between the intent
to conceive and the intent to procreate: the frozen embryo dispute cases.
Imagine that a husband and wife want to have children. Unable to
conceive naturally, they decide to pursue IVF. After successful sperm and
egg retrieval, ten embryos are created, three of which are transferred to the
wife’s uterus and the remaining seven are cryogenically preserved. One
90. Id. at 1030; Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007).
91. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1041 (noting that “all that is constitutional is not

necessarily wise. We are mindful of . . . the chance of the availability of two parents—
and two parents’ resources—to Kansas children”); see also Ferguson, 940 A.2d at
1248 (“This Court takes very seriously the best interests of the children of this
Commonwealth, and we recognize that to rule in favor of the Sperm Donor in this case
denies a source of support to two children who did not ask to be born into this situation.
Absent the parties’ agreement, however, the twins would not have been born at all, or
would have been born to a different and anonymous sperm donor, who neither party
disputes would be safe from a support order.”).
92. Federal Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (2006).
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embryo successfully implants in the uterine wall; unfortunately, the wife
miscarries in her first trimester. The stress of infertility, IVF, and the
miscarriage take a toll. By the time the wife has physically recovered such
that she can consider another embryo transfer, the husband seeks a divorce
and forbids her from using the embryos. Although the husband had
intended to reproduce during the IVF process, he no longer wishes to
reproduce now. Uniformly, courts have upheld his right not to procreate.
In Davis v. Davis,93 a Tennessee court was the first to address a dispute
between a divorcing couple’s use of frozen embryos. The court balanced
the right of the husband not to procreate against the wife’s desire to donate
the embryos.94 At first, the wife wanted to use them, but during the
litigation, she changed her mind and sought, instead, to donate them to
another couple.95 The court held that the husband’s right not to procreate
was paramount and that the wife could not use or donate the preembryos
against his will.96 The court explained, “Any disposition which results in
the gestation of the preembryos would impose unwanted parenthood on
him, with all of its possible financial and psychological consequences.”97
The reference to financial consequences demonstrates the court’s particular
concern with unwanted legal parenthood.
In A.Z. v. B.Z.,98 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts balanced
the wife’s right to use preembryos and her right to procreate against her
husband’s right not to procreate. Although this couple had signed
numerous forms in which the couple had said the wife could use the
embryos in the event of separation, the court questioned whether the
agreement was binding.99 Moreover, the court said it would not enforce a
prior agreement to enter into parenthood because that would run counter to
the Supreme Court’s stated right of “the freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life.”100 The court further wrote:
We derive from existing State laws and judicial precedent a public policy
in this Commonwealth that individuals shall not be compelled to enter
into intimate family relationships, and that the law shall not be used as a
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 603.
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 1057. The court was concerned that the husband had signed several
consent forms in blank and might not have intended his wife to use the pre-embryos
after their separation. Id. The court further concluded that “even had the husband and
the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves regarding the
disposition of the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that would
compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will.” Id.
100. See id. at 1059 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)).
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mechanism for forcing such relationships when they are not desired.
This policy is grounded in the notion that liberty and privacy requires
that individuals be accorded the freedom to decide whether to enter into
a family relationship.101

Thus, the husband’s intention not to parent trumped the wife’s desire to
parent. Moreover, the intent not to procreate was validated by the court
even though this man had expressed the intent to procreate at an earlier
point in time and had taken affirmative steps to procreate.102 The court was
clearly reluctant to impose unwanted parentage on someone who no longer
had the desire to become a parent.103 Ironically, at least at some point in
the process, the plaintiff had wanted to become a parent and had taken
steps in furtherance of his goal. He exercised a greater intent to procreate
than the man who had no intent to procreate at any time, yet who was
deemed the legal parent after conceiving a child through sexual intercourse.
The UPA further exemplifies the importance of intention over biology in
the context of ART.104 Section 706 specifically addresses how parentage
will be determined in the event of the parties’ divorce or one party’s
withdrawal of consent. Subsection (a) provides that unless a former spouse
specifically consented that if ART occurs after divorce s/he will be the
parent, the default position is that the former spouse is not the parent of the
resulting child.105 Subsection (b) includes unmarried individuals and
further clarifies that if an individual withdraws consent to assisted
reproduction, that individual is not a parent of the resulting child.106 The
comment further explains, “[A] child born through assisted reproduction
accomplished after consent has been voided by divorce or withdrawn in a
record will have a legal mother under section 201(a)(1). However, the
child will have a genetic father, but not a legal father. In this instance,
intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor . . . .”107 At least
nine states have adopted, exactly or in large measure, section 706 of the
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1052-53 (remarking on the numerous fertility treatments that the

husband and wife underwent between 1980 and 1991).
103. Id. at 1058.
104. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 72 (Supp.
2011) (declaring that “intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor” regarding
liability in parentage following divorce or withdrawal of consent).
105. Id. § 706(a), 9B U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 2011) (“If a marriage is dissolved before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after a divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child.”).
106. Id. § 706(b) (“The consent of a woman or a man to assisted reproduction may
be withdrawn by that individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos. An individual who withdraws consent under this section is not a
parent of the resulting child.”).
107. Id. § 706 cmt.
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UPA.108
By separating genetic and legal parenthood in this context, the UPA
embraces a broad view of procreative liberty; one that does not impose
unwanted legal parenthood regardless of biological connection.109 In
addition, the UPA gives legitimacy to a family composed of a single
mother and child.110 Like the situation in which a single mother seeks to
become pregnant using the sperm of a known donor, the UPA permits a
woman to use embryos created with a former husband or partner to create a
single parent family.111 The procreative liberty of both individuals is thus
protected: the woman may proceed with her desire to procreate and parent
while the intent of the man not to procreate is also honored.
CONCLUSION
Deferring to procreative liberty, courts are embracing intentional
parenthood as a means by which to determine legal parentage in lieu of
biological connection. Intentional parenthood has been recognized both as
a way in which to establish parenthood as well as a way in which to avoid
the responsibilities of legal parentage.112 As the use of ART increases, so,
too, will the application of intentional parenthood.113 As I have explored in
this Essay, the dichotomy between establishing parenthood (or not) through
intention and establishing parentage through biological connection is
widening.
Federal paternity establishment policy is particularly inflexible and at
odds with intentional parenthood doctrine.114 Although supporters of the
108. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-706 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2011);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-706 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-706 (2010); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-20-64 (2011); TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.706 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-706 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.725 (West
2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-906 (2011).
109. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 cmt. (stressing the importance of intention
over biology).
110. See id. § 702 cmt. (explaining that a child may have no legally recognized
fathers in situations where donors provided sperm for assisted reproduction by
unmarried women).
111. See id. § 706 (describing the legal effects of the dissolution of a marriage on a
child’s parentage where a former spouse proceeds with assisted reproduction following
divorce).
112. See id. § 702 cmt. (guaranteeing rights of parenthood to a family without a
father); see also id. § 706 cmt. (allowing the biological father to abdicate any
responsibility when the child was conceived using ART).
113. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 prefatory n. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 67
(Supp. 2011) (noting the rise in medical science over the last thirty years that results in
thousands of children born in the United States due to ART and the growing need to
clarify parentage of a child born under complicated ART circumstances).
114. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 598-99 (2002)
(addressing the conflict between the federal preference to preserve the “traditional
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current legal system argue that a child must have two parents as a source of
support, child support enforcement collection does not meet theoretical
expectations and, in fact, may actually be harmful to the potential parentchild relationship as well as the relationship between the child’s mother and
father. Moreover, within the ART context, courts are validating single
parent families. We are thus left with two distinct family law regimes: one
in which deference is given to procreative liberty and private ordering
family formation, and the other, in which, due largely to moral and
financial concerns, no deference is given to such liberty and private
ordering interests. Ultimately, the crucial difference between the two
models is sexual intercourse but as I have argued, the intent to engage in
sexual relations does not imply the intent to procreate.
Although courts have historically rejected claims that paternity statutes
violate procreative liberty, those claims may have new traction when
considered in light of the increased use of intentional parenthood within the
ART context. Due to the deference and protection given to known sperm
donors and male IVF donors who withdraw their consent, men who had no
intent to procreate through intercourse may be able to argue that they are
not being treated equally under the law and that paternity statutes do, in
fact, violate their equal protection. Unlike the previous arguments that
were framed as men not having a negative procreative right as compared to
women, which has historically failed, the new argument would be
compared with other men who have been allowed to preserve their negative
procreative right. I acknowledge that it is unlikely that federal paternity
policy will be changed anytime soon. But as intentional parenthood’s
influence grows, we should rethink the constitutionality and legitimacy of
the current system.

image of the marital couple bearing children” and developing useful policies to address
intentional parentage).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/5

20

